Anderson v. Celebrezze

Anderson v. Celebrezze
Docket number: 81-1635
Term: 1982
Court: United States Supreme Court
Court membership
Chief Justice Warren Burger • William Brennan • Byron White • Thurgood Marshall • Harry Blackmun • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens • Sandra Day O'Connor

Anderson v. Celebrezze is a case that was decided during the 1982 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. In the case, the court considered the constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates as applied to independent candidates for the presidency.

Background

On April 24, 1980, John Anderson announced his intention to run as an independent candidate for the presidency of the United States. On May 16, 1980, supporters of Anderson's candidacy presented a statement of candidacy and 14,500 signatures to the Ohio Secretary of State, Anthony J. Celebrezze. Celebrezze refused to accept the materials citing §3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised Code, which required filing the materials on or before March 20 of that year.

On May 19, 1980, Anderson, two registered Ohio voters, and a registered New Jersey voter, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates. The District Court granted the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and ordered Celebrezze to put Anderson's name on the general election ballot in Ohio.

The District Court held that the Ohio statutory deadline was unconstitutional on two grounds:

• 1) The deadline imposed an impermissible burden on Anderson's and his Ohio supporters' First Amendment rights and diluted the potential value of votes cast for Anderson in other states.
• 2) By requiring an independent candidate to file in March without requiring a comparable action by nominees from political parties, the State violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Celebrezze appealed unsuccessfully to both the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States for expedited review, which was denied. At no time did Celebrezze seek to stay the District Court's order. Pending appeal, the general election was held with Anderson on the ballot.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling. The Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's early deadline "ensures that voters making the important choice of their next president have the opportunity for a careful look at the candidates, a chance to see how they withstand the close scrutiny of a political campaign."

Decision

In a 5-4 decision, the judgment of the Sixth Circuit was reversed.

Opinion

Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited the Court's opinion in Bullock v. Carter when he noted "in approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." While recognizing that not all restrictions imposed by states on candidate eligibility "impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates", Justice Stevens found that under the Ohio statute "a late-emerging Presidential candidate outside the major parties, whose positions on the issues could command widespread community support, is excluded from the Ohio general election ballot. The 'Ohio system thus denies the disaffected not only a choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as well'" (citing Williams v. Rhodes).

Justice Stevens noted "it is clear, then, that the March filing deadline places a particular burden on indentifiable segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters ... As our cases have held, "it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference or economic status ... A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It discriminates against those candidates and -- of particular importance -- against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties."

Justice Stevens noted that Ohio's three stated interests -- voter education, equal treatment, and political stability -- did not justify the statutory filing deadline for independent candidates.

Justice Stevens concluded:

“

We began our inquiry by noting that our primary concern is not the interest of candidate Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson's candidacy and the views he espoused. Under any realistic appraisal, the "extent and nature" of the burdens Ohio has placed on the voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association, in an election of nationwide importance, unquestionably outweigh the State's minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.

”

Dissent

In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Byron White, Lewis Powell, and Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice William Rehnquist argued that "the Constitution does not require that a State allow any particular Presidential candidate to be on its ballot, and so long as the Ohio ballot access laws are rational and allow nonparty candidates reasonable access to the general election ballot, this Court should not interfere with Ohio's exercise of its ... power" under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors" who shall select the President of the United States.

Justice Rehnquist further argued:

“

...there is nothing in the record to indicate that this is a case where "independent-minded voters" are prevented from rallying behind a candidate selected later in the election year so as to guarantee "major parties" a monopoly on the election process. Like-minded voters who do not want to participate in an existing political party are at complete liberty to form a new political party and obtain for themselves the same flexibility that established political parties have in the selection of their nominee for President. It is true that Ohio provides this benefit only where a group of voters acts with some foresight and shows a degree of support among the electorate, but this case presents no challenge to these requirements. On the record before us, the effect of the Ohio filing deadline is quite easily summarized: it requires that a candidate, who has already decided to run for President, decide by March 20 which route his candidacy will take. He can become a nonparty candidate by filing a nominating petition with 5,000 signatures and assure himself a place on the general election ballot. Or he can become a party candidate and take his chances in securing a position on the general election ballot by seeking the nomination of a party's national convention. Anderson chose the latter route and submitted in a timely fashion his nominating petition for Ohio's Republican Primary. Then, realizing that he had no chance for the Republican nomination, Anderson sought to change the form of this candidacy. The Ohio filing deadline prevented him from making this change. Quite clearly, rather than prohibiting him from seeking the Presidency, the filing deadline only prevented Anderson from having two shots at it in the same election year ... The Court's opinion protects this particular kind of candidate — an individual who decides well in advance to become a Presidential candidate, decides which route to follow in seeking a position on the general election ballot, and, after seeing his hopes turn to ashes, wants to try another route. The Court's opinion draws no line; I presume that a State must wait until all party nominees are chosen and then allow all unsuccessful party candidates to refight their party battles by forming an "independent" candidacy. I find nothing in the Constitution which requires this result.

”

See also

• Ballot access for major and minor party candidates
• Other ballot access lawsuits:
  • Williams v. Rhodes (1968)
  • Bullock v. Carter (1972)
  • Lubin v. Panish (1974)
  • Storer v. Brown (1974)
  • Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party (1979)
  • Norman v. Reed (1992)
  • U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995)

External links

• Anderson v. Celebrezze - 460 U.S. 780 (1983)